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Copyright plays a pivotal role in the contemporary cultural industries. It applies to 
virtually all cultural creations that have been published over the last five to ten 
decades.1 It defines who is entitled to reproduce a protected creative work, who may 
make it available to the public and who may modify it. This has obvious implications 
for the commercial use of creative works and ultimately for who gets to consume 
them. It does not get much more central than this.  
According to the seminal European Directive on copyright in the information society 
(DIR 2001/29/EC), the official aim of copyright is to promote innovation and 
creativity in the regulated sector2. Over the last years, however, much of the copyright 
regime has been put into question. Right holders have found it difficult to enforce their 
exclusive rights to digitally captured copyrighted works. Many users circumvent 
copyrights on the Internet or by forwarding copies of protected works on CD-Rs and 
                                                 
1  Copyright applies automatically and without prior test of the quality of an original publication. The 
duration is harmonised among EU member states to cover 70 years after the death of the author or 
50 years after the publication date for performers’ ‘related rights’. 
2  With this Directive, the EU has begun to regulate central issues of copyright (especially relating to 
the digital environment) on the supra-national Union level. The Directive does not mention the 
protection of certain ‘natural rights’ of authors to the works they created that are an additional 
justification for copyright in much of continental Europe.  
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DVDs to third parties. A surge in unauthorised copying3 has probably been the most 
significant recent development in the markets for music. Industry representatives have 
claimed that they lose billions each year in the process. This new wave of unauthorised 
copying is also starting to affect the markets for television broadcasts and feature 
films. Many regard unauthorised copying via the Internet or CD-burners to pose a 
threat to commercial suppliers of reproducible cultural works generally unless 
restrictions are imposed. The response in most major markets has been to bring 
copyright extensions under way and to increase investments into enforcement 
measures.  
These measures are of strategic importance for the way cultural works will be 
incorporated into new digital information networks. Copyright is a cornerstone of the 
cultural industries as we know them. Nevertheless, there remain unsettling gaps in our 
knowledge of the extent to which copyright safeguards innovation and creativity in 
practice, and how it affects the cultural industries otherwise. 
In the context of a substantial shift in the copyright regime, it is hardly satisfactory to 
take copyright for granted. In order to understand recent developments in the cultural 
industries, we need to take account of changes to the copyright regime. This holds for 
researchers as well as policy makers. The purpose of this paper is to link the discourse 
on cultural industries presented in this volume with some of the economic literature on 
copyright. It attempts to provide an introduction to fundamental arguments and 
particularly pressing questions. In so doing, it draws on several forthcoming 
publications on the economics of copyright and the record industry (co-)authored by 
the author of this article.4 Economists seem to have taken the lead regarding empirical 
                                                 
3  In the long-run, file-sharing is probably the more fundamental challenge to the copyright regime 
and established business models. File-sharing has received a lot more attention in the economic 
literature. For convenience, unauthorised copying and file-sharing are sometimes used 
interchangeably below. 
4  Ch. Handke, P. Stepan and R. Towse, “Development of the Economics of Copyright”, Handbook 
on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, ed. J. Drexl (München: Max-Planck-Institut für 
Geistiges Eigentum, Wettbewerbs- und Steuerrecht, forthcoming).  
 Ch. Handke, “Plain Destruction or Creative Destruction? Copyright Erosion and the Evolution of 
the Record Industry”, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 3.2 (December 2006): 29-
51.  
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contributions to the debate. They are reasonably well equipped to promote our 
understanding of copyright in many respects. Nevertheless, as will be apparent below, 
many pressing questions relating to the copyright regime and its consequences 
probably require greater input by specialists on the cultural industries and from other 
academic disciplines.5
There seem to be two broad and salient gaps in much of the economic literature. One 
is that several idiosyncrasies of the cultural industries – the peculiar incentive structure 
of creators, the current industry structure and issues of competition, as well as broader 
technological changes – seem to receive little attention in economic studies of 
unauthorised copying. The other is that empirical evidence on the effect of 
unauthorised copying (e.g. via file-sharing networks) on consumers’ interests has 
received little attention. 
Section two introduces the example of the record industry and some of its relevant 
economic characteristics. The record industry serves well to illustrate the apparent 
relevance of copyright. A surge in unauthorised copying notoriously coincides with 
falling turnover in most major markets for authorised copies of sound recordings. This 
development has provided an important impetus to a series of copyright reforms and 
an intense debate on the future of the copyright regime more generally. 
Section three presents a broad-brush account of the economic understanding of 
copyright. It comes out clearly in this literature that simple slogans such as “you would 
not steal a chocolate bar, so do not steal cultural works” are unlikely to provide 
sustainable guidelines. Instead, the theoretical literature evokes trade-offs between 
competing ends. From this perspective, a set of reasonably well defined empirical 
                                                                                                                                                        
 Ch. Handke, Wachstum gegen den Trend – Grundlegende Ergebnisse der VUT-Mitglieder-
befragung 2005 unter kleinen und mittleren Tonträgerunternehmen, online, 16 January 2006, 
available http://www.vut-online.de/studie_wachstum_gegen_den_trend_-_vut.pdf.  
 Ch. Handke, “Bad for Universal – but Universally Bad? The Uneven Effects of the Current Crisis 
in the German Phonogram Industry”, RECIDA Working Paper 9 (2005). 
5  Regarding the music industry, the interested reader will find a useful, broader introduction to 
copyright from the perspectives of various disciplines in Frith and Marshall (eds.), Music and 
Copyright, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003). 
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questions need to be addressed in order to determine whether increasing levels of 
unauthorised copying justify a strengthening of the copyright regime. 
Section four points out two remaining gaps in the research agenda on unauthorised 
copying and the record industry. This section refers back to the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the record industry introduced in section two and attempts to develop 
links to the literature on file-sharing. The basic point is that the assessment might be 
incomplete if the focus remains on the industry at large, rather than allowing for 
consumers’ interests and divergent interests among different types of producers to 
enter the analysis. 
Section five reviews some data with relevance to consumers’ interests and divergent 
interests among suppliers. For what this first glimpse at some of the evidence is worth, 
the findings seem at odds with frequently made assumptions regarding the effects of 
unauthorised copying. It goes to show that in spite of falling revenues, only very 
limited – if any – adverse developments on the supply side are apparent. The paper 
concludes by suggesting several topics for further research. 
 
The Record Industry and Unauthorised Copying 
The record industry has become emblematic in the debate on reforming copyright. 
This is due to two roughly simultaneous events. First, a surge in unauthorised copying 
via CD-burners and file-sharing networks has occurred. What this means is that users 
enjoyed an unprecedented catalogue of works at their disposal at comparatively 
minuscule costs and without compensation to right holders. The record industry was 
affected as the first of the traditional cultural industries.6 Second, the record industry 
has reported a worldwide recession in the market for phonograms (International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry [IFPI]). According to many, there is a causal 
link between a greater intensity of unauthorised copying and falling sales. The 
                                                 
6  The software industry has had this problem from the moment it started serving a mass market. 
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example of the record industry has inspired highly politicised debates on copyright 
reforms.  
The prevailing notion is that something needs to be done. Legislators throughout the 
major markets have extended the scope (and sometimes the duration) of copyright 
entitlements. Important copyright owners have lobbied for such extensions. Many also 
invested in enforcement measures including technical measures such as Digital Rights 
Management (DRM), ran awareness campaigns and filed suits against downloaders. 
As it is, copyright reforms will affect all types of protected works. They do not only 
aim to revert recent dramatic developments in the record industry. They will also set 
the rules under which other types of copyrighted, creative works enter the digital 
realm. 
The following section addresses some basic economic characteristics of the record 
industry, many of which they share with other cultural industries and which seem of 
particular relevance in the debate on reforming copyright. 
 
Basic Economic Characteristics of the Record Industry 
The record industry produces and commercialises sound recordings, mainly of musical 
performances. Media technologies that allow to store, reproduce, distribute and 
consume sound enable them to do so. The focus of this paper is on the primary market 
for records, in which copies of recordings are sold to end-consumers. 
The record industry shares several basic characteristics with other typical cultural or 
creative industries (cf. Caves 2000). The cultural goods and services marketed are 
highly differentiated and so are the skills of creators. Suppliers face uncertain demand 
conditions especially for new creations and have to deal with great risks. Creative 
workers are often self-motivated. Their production decisions cannot always be 
explained by a rational maximisation of pecuniary rewards alone (cf. Frey; Caves; 
Throsby; Towse, Creativity, Incentive and Reward) and many create value as more or 
less unpaid amateurs (cf. Brosio). Furthermore, recordings are durable and 
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reproducible information goods that cannot easily be turned into exclusive private 
property. Copyright can in large parts be understood as a measure to alleviate the 
problem associated with the provision of such ‘public goods’ by private suppliers. This 
point will be developed further in section three. Copyright is another uniting feature of 
the cultural industries. It automatically applies to the vast majority of new 
publications. 
The contemporary record industry is of general interest because it clearly displays 
several trends throughout the cultural and creative industries. First, the record industry 
has grown substantially over much of the 1980s and 1990s (for a time-series of 
turnover in the UK and Germany, see figure 2). More recently, the data published by 
industry lead-bodies suggests that this expansion has come to an end and made way for 
a recession that is particularly pronounced in Germany (British Phonographic Industry 
[BPI], Statistical Handbook 2006; Bundesverband der Phonographischen Wirtschaft 
[BV Phono]). Second, the record industry has a long history as a truly global industry 
in which multinational firms distribute media content in virtually identical form 
worldwide (e.g. Malm and Wallis; Negus; Towse, Cultural Economics).7  
Yet, this global aspect of the record industry is only one of its aspects because, third, it 
exhibits a polarised industry structure. On the one hand, a handful of relatively large 
multinational record companies – the so-called ‘majors’ – account for around three 
quarters of the world market and cover most aspects of the value chain in-house 
(IFPI). At the moment, these majors are Universal Music, SonyBMG, Warner Music 
and EMI. These companies excel especially in international distribution and provide 
related services even to many of their smaller competitors. The other extreme is found 
in the creation of musical recordings. This occurs in a multitude of small 
organisational units. Creators and intermediary firms such as record companies form 
temporary exclusive cooperation agreements (e.g. a ‘record deal’). A vast number of 
smaller record companies – with or without links to the major actors – create a middle 
                                                 
7  The integration of an important part of the record industry does not mean that there is no scope for 
local traditions, styles and trends, however. In Britain and Germany about half of the market value 
is comprised of “domestic repertoire” (47% and 48% in 2003 respectively) according to the IFPI 
(157). 
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layer between the two extremes of multinational corporations and small creative 
projects. Locally operating small, independent companies seem to have an advantage 
in niche markets and in the discovery and development of new creative projects, new 
styles and trends (e.g. Negus 42ff.; Burnett). Ideally, a dynamic balance between 
majors and so-called ‘indies’ leads to a mutually beneficial co-existence. Burnett (The 
Global Jukebox) draws an analogy to a “symbiosis”. This certainly does not preclude 
fierce competition and conflicts, in particular during recurrent periods of crisis due to 
broader changes in the industry (see e.g. Chapple and Garofalo; Caves; Tschmuck).8
Fourth, the record industry appears to be in a period of relatively swift technological 
change. The diffusion of powerful copying technology is one momentous aspect of 
this. Another one is the authorised delivery of musical recordings without a specially 
dedicated tangible carrier – via the Internet or mobile telephone networks – that is 
relatively well advanced.9 ‘Digital’ distribution has often been predicted to bring 
pervasive change to the industry (Goldstein; Alexander; Burnett; Tschmuck). One way 
to determine the significance of technological change in the record industry is 
investigating its interplay with the industries’ creativity, i.e. the creation of new 
cultural goods and services. Another is what the consequences of technological change 
and innovation are for various types of market participants, competition and 
efficiency. At first sight, it might seem likely for example that consumers’ interests 
with respect to the regulation of file-sharing diverge from those of many suppliers, or 
that creators have different interests from those of some intermediary firms. 
Not all contributions to the debate on file-sharing and the record industry take account 
of the industry’s idiosyncrasies. Arguably, this omission leaves important gaps in the 
assessment of the situation. Before the implications of these points are developed 
                                                 
8  A recent example is the intervention of the industry lead-body for independent record companies 
IMPALA with the European Competition Authorities that looks likely to force Sony Music and 
BMG to retract from their merger executed in 2004. 
9  Of course, unauthorised copying and authorised digital distribution make use of essentially the 
same ICT devices and networks, the main difference being whether right holders retain some 
control over who gets access so that they can enforce their commercial interests. Undoubtedly, the 
application of ICT has had similarly broad, but much less well documented, implications beyond 
the distribution of recordings, e.g. concerning the recording process or back office tasks. 
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further, this paper reviews some of the basic empirical observations that sparked the 
debate on file-sharing in the first place. 
 
The Surge in Unauthorised Copying and Demand for Authorised Copies 
In many major markets for recordings, the surge of unauthorised copying with the 
diffusion of CD-burners and of file-sharing networks coincide with a slow-down in 
sales for authorised copies. This supports the view that unauthorised copying 
diminishes demand for authorised copies. The coincidence is especially striking in the 
German market – the second largest in Europe and fourth largest worldwide. For this 
market, relatively detailed data is available – probably because right holders sought to 
communicate their difficulties effectively. See figure 1 for a time-series of the real 
value of sales in the primary market of recordings10 where authorised copies – e.g. on 
CDs, cassettes, vinyl records or as downloads – are sold to end-consumers for private 
use. Figure 1 also includes various indicators for unauthorised copying (for a more 
detailed discussion of the data see Handke, “Plain Destruction”). According to roughly 
simultaneous developments in the use of copying technology among end consumers 
and turnover in the market for authorised copies, it seems possible to distinguish 
between two periods: first, the (end of) boom period during which turnover hummed 
along at historically high, if stagnating, levels; second, the recession period during 
which first CD-Burners, then – since June 1999 and the emergence of Napster – file-
sharing networks and more recently DVD-burners were widely used and sales of 
authorised copies fell by more than 2% annually in real terms. A dotted grey line 
separates the boom years 1990 to 1997 and the recession period 1998 to 2005. During 
the years 2001 and 2003, sales fell especially fast. Overall, the market value decreased 
by more than 43% between 1997 and 2005.  
                                                 
10  At retail value. 
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FIGURE 1: Real value of sales in the primary market for recordings in 
Germany and the diffusion of copying technology
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Not all major markets have experienced a similarly pronounced recession since the late 
1990s. See figure 2 for a time-series of the sales in Britain and Germany. A dotted 
grey line marks the beginning of the mass distribution of digital copying technology. 
To facilitate comparisons, the data is presented as an index setting the year 1997 (the 
year before unauthorised copying via CD-burners and file-sharing was first 
acknowledged as a problem for the record industry) at 100. In Britain – the largest 
primary market for recordings in Europe – sales11 fell after 1997, too. Yet, they did so 
considerably later and so far less severely than in Germany. These divergent 
experiences cannot be explained by lower levels of unauthorised copying in Britain 
alone. To be sure, for this country no complete time-series of the estimated number of 
downloads was available (the results of the main studies are proprietary) and the 
methodologies of German and British surveys are not comparable. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the diffusion of copying technology in Britain is not radically different 
from that in Germany. Unauthorised copying via file-sharing networks or CD-burners 
also seems to be widely practised in the UK. The BPI (Statistical Handbook 2006 86) 
quotes data that “downloaders reduced spend may have cost the industry as much as 
£1.1 billion in lost retail sales over the past three years”, which amounts to nearly 20% 
                                                 
11  Trade deliveries at retail value. 
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of actual sales between 2003 and 2005. According to their sources, in 2005, 360 
million blank CDs were sold in the UK, up from 251 million in 2000. Of these blank 
CDs, 62% (223 million) are supposed to have been used for “home recording” in 2005. 
The BPI (Statistical Handbook 2004 and 2006) emphasises problems with professional 
counterfeiting of CDs, which seem less intense in Germany. 
FIGURE 2: Index of sales (real value) in the German and British 
primary market for recordings (1997=100)


































































Divergent experiences in different national markets are only one of several reasons to 
be cautious with firm statements on the effect of unauthorised copying on demand. 
Generally speaking, it is anything but easy to determine what things would have been 
like without the intervention of a surge in unauthorised copying. Turnover in the two 
markets investigated has fluctuated substantially in the past. Neither was particularly 
dynamic in the years immediately preceding the mass diffusion of digital copying 
technology, even though the general trend over the last fifteen years or so had been 
positive. Nevertheless, at face value the data is reasonably consistent with the view 
that the diffusion of copying technology reduces suppliers’ revenues. In Germany, the 
size of the market has fallen dramatically. In Britain, the industry stopped growing 
with a surge in unauthorised copying.  
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Most elaborate empirical contributions studying the short run impact of file-sharing on 
record sales find that file-sharing has had some adverse effect on record sales. (For 
surveys of the literature see Peitz and Walbroek, “Piracy of Digital Products”, and 
Liebowitz, “Economists”). Estimates of the extent of this effect differ considerably, 
however. The majority of the available studies focus on the US market. They attempt 
to control for various factors that might have influenced sales such as the size and 
wealth of relevant age groups in the population, the operation of effective promotion 
channels such as broadcasts featuring attractive music, the retail infrastructure, or the 
availability of competing entertainment goods and services. Beyond this task, there are 
two further challenges to empirical studies. First, the data available on the record 
industry and unauthorised copying of recordings are a prime example of the more 
general difficulties with access to reasonable comprehensive and reliable data on the 
cultural industries (Towse, Cultural Economics; Caves; Liebowitz, “MP3 
downloads”). Much of the publicly available data has been assembled by interested 
parties. Second, it seems particularly difficult to isolate the effects of unauthorised 
copying at this point in time. On the one hand, the record industry is highly 
concentrated in a handful of multinational firms and concerns for market power are 
rife. That competition authorities have thwarted several proposed mergers between 
major record companies over the last years provides a good illustration. On the other, 
the record industry appears to be in a state of technological and structural change. In 
this context, two basic abstractions that facilitate econometric analyses – perfect 
competition and market equilibrium – cannot easily be taken for granted.  
In short, empirical evidence suggests that the interests of suppliers at large have been 
harmed somewhat by unauthorised copying. To many, the examples of the relatively 
well researched US market or the particularly hard-hit German market establish that 
file-sharing is a serious threat and deserves careful attention. Yet, a considerable 
degree of uncertainty remains regarding the exact scale of its adverse effect, which is 
another good reason to pay attention to file-sharing, especially because the issue plays 
such an important role in driving the debate on copyright reforms. The following 
account of the basic economics of copying and copyright will illustrate that this 
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uncertainty is even more fundamental than acknowledged so far. That is because 
establishing the effect of unauthorised copying on sales of authorised copies is not 
enough to guide public copyright policy.  
 
The Basic Economics of Copying and Copyright and its Application to the File-
Sharing Debate 
Copyright endows creators with temporary monopoly rights – the rough equivalent of 
property – to their original creations. Creators often pass on large parts of their 
copyright entitlements to firms that specialise in the exploitation of such rights (e.g. 
publishers and record companies) so that intermediary firms are important right 
holders, too. A range of economic concepts has been invoked to justify copyright or to 
explain its function. Below, an attempt is made to lay out the foundations of the 
understanding of copyright as developed on the basis of economic theory while 
restricting the use of the specialised terminology.12 The focus is on the question of 
how to determine the effect of unauthorised copying and by implication the adequate 
level of investments into countermeasures such as copyright. The natural rights 
argument that few economists have addressed (and even fewer endorse as providing a 
useful function) is not included.13 Alternatives to copyright (e.g. Plant; Shavell and 
van Ypersele; Farchy and Rochelandet; Varian) or the details of copyright law (see 
Towse, “Copyright and Artists”; Landes and Posner) are also beyond the scope of this 
account. 
The basic argument starts out with two characteristics of information goods such as 
reproducible creative works. First, while creators have to invest time and resources to 
produce a new work, these creations are difficult to turn into exclusive private 
property. Once a creation has been published, it can be reproduced and disseminated at 
                                                 
12  For a more extensive survey see Handke, Towse and Stepan; Gordon and Bone; Towse and 
Holzhauer; Liebowitz and Watt; Towse, “Copyright and Artists”; and the wide-ranging Landes and 
Posner. 
13  As mentioned in section 2.1, creators do not seem to be responsive to pecuniary incentives alone. It 
is imaginable that privileges reserved to creators in copyright law that have no apparent 
commercial use safeguard their intrinsic motivation.  
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relatively low costs by whoever has access to a copy and the adequate ICT. 
Controlling this process is beyond the scope of most individual right holders. The 
question arises how right holders can recoup their investments into creativity if many 
can benefit form the output without compensating the creator. Second, information is 
not depleted by use. In contrast to a material object – say an apple that is eaten – use 
by one individual tends not to preclude the use by others. These two characteristics of 
reproducible cultural works mean that in contrast to material goods, the exhaustion of 
information through excessive use is not a problem but safeguarding pecuniary 
incentives to create might be. Musical recordings are a prime example: they require 
input by skilled contributors as well as the use of instruments and recording 
technology. Once the recording process is completed, the costs of copying the work to 
a CD or to put it online and download it are relatively low.  
Copyright aims to foster incentives to create by endowing creators with temporary 
monopoly rights to their creations. It allows right holders to bar others from using and 
distributing a copyrighted work. They can charge prices in excess of the costs of 
producing additional copies, which gives them the opportunity to recoup their initial 
investment in the creative process.14  
However, a copyright system is costly (Watt; Landes). To start with, it entails 
administrative and enforcement costs. A copyright system needs to be defined and 
administered by governmental (legislative) and judicial bodies. Laws have to be 
backed up by enforcement efforts, i.e. infringements need to be identified and 
sanctioned. Some of these costs fall onto the general public. Others fall onto each 
participant of a regulated market, who needs to administer her own rights or to ensure 
compliance with other rightholders’ entitlements. What is more, a copyright system 
creates access costs. Consumers who value the work by more than the cost of making 
additional copies, but less than the price being charged are excluded. The point of 
copyright protection is to keep those unwilling to pay the asking price from using 
                                                 
14  In practice, income to creators is skewed so that looking at individual creators, a situation where 
costs are recouped is the exception. Most published copyright works do not recover their costs, 
while a minority generates great profits to right holders. Over the entire repertoire of a larger 
publisher or record company, the concept of recouping costs might be more realistic. 
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protected works. It thus usually generates a state of underutilisation of the existent 
pool of cultural creations. Policy makers are faced with a trade-off between 
underproduction in the context of unauthorised copying and underutilisation in the 
context of (temporary) monopolies. Sometimes this is taken to mean trading off 
suppliers’ and consumers’ interests. Access costs also incur where creators are 
deterred from building upon prior works because they are unwilling to pay the price 
the copyright holder demands. It follows that over time, “(p)aradoxically, too much 
copyright protection can reduce the number of new works created” (Landes 13). 
In short, a system of property to intangible information goods such as cultural works 
tends to be a lot more costly than it is in the case of material goods. It is more difficult 
to establish because information cannot easily be fenced in. The opportunity costs of 
doing so are also relatively great because once a creation is captured in reproducible 
form, no amount of use would devalue it. That is, one basic argument in favour of 
private property – avoiding overuse and the depletion of resources in the public 
domain – does not apply. Many economists take this to believe that copyright 
entitlements should be weaker than property to material assets, as in fact they are.15 
This reasoning leads most economists to address copyright in terms of a cost-benefit 
trade-off, where the costs of unauthorised copying need to be set into relation to the 
costs of effective countermeasures. That is, economic theory alone makes no clear-cut 
prediction as to the net effect of unauthorised copying on producers or for society at 
large. Assessing this effect and by implication the desirability of countermeasures 
requires an analysis of the specific circumstances of the market affected. It is an 
empirical question (cf. Towse, “Copyright and Economic Incentives”; Liebowitz, 
“MP3 downloads”). 
 
                                                 
15  These limits include the limited duration of copyright and so-called “fair use” that permits 
unauthorised copying under certain circumstances without the right holder’s permission. 
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Does a Surge in Unauthorised Copying Justify Strengthening the Copyright Regime? 
In the record industry, the current diffusion of a more powerful copying technology 
has lead to a surge in unauthorised copying. In this context the question arises whether 
increased levels of unauthorised copying justify efforts to strengthen the copyright 
regime. To answer this question, the effect of unauthorised copying needs to be 
specified. For the argument developed in this paper, it is useful to clearly distinguish 
between three steps in this assessment:  
1. Cheaper unauthorised copies can substitute the purchase of authorised copies. 
Where this happens, unauthorised copying displaces demand. The extent of this 
substitution effect depends on the relative costs of unauthorised and authorised 
copies, the extent to which consumers favour originals, and the deterrence of 
would-be infringers through existent enforcement measures.   
2. Second, if there is a significant substitution effect, unauthorised copying makes 
it more difficult for producers to recoup the costs of producing the first original. 
Creators and intermediary firms that finance them are at a cost disadvantage in 
comparison to free-riding competitors that make copies available without 
investing in the creation of the original. The economic literature on copying 
suggests that there are some factors that might offset the adverse effect of 
unauthorised copying on those investing in creativity. Network effects might 
apply so that the value of some information goods increase with the number of 
people that use them (say if people appreciate talking about music they are 
familiar with). Furthermore, when right holders are aware that a particular type 
of users passes on the copyrighted works to many others, they might simply 
charge this group higher prices. Liebowitz (“Copying and Indirect 
Appropriability”) coined the expression ‘indirect appropriability’ and observed 
that this was precisely what publishers of academic journals have done with the 
arrival of photocopiers in most libraries. They simply charged libraries higher 
subscription fees. Finally, consumers might come to value some authorised 
copies more if they are able to sample them via free streams or downloads. If 
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authorised copies are perceived to be more valuable than unauthorised 
downloads, sampling might have a similar promotional effect as airplay on 
broadcasting channels is supposed to have. It is a contentious question whether 
any of these potentially mitigating factors do play a significant role in the case 
of the record industry affected by file-sharing.  
The effect of unauthorised copying on producers’ interests is addressed in these first 
two steps in the reasoning for copyright. The related questions – whether copyright 
displaces demand and suppliers lose revenues – has attracted copious attention. 
Section 2.2 presented some of the widely debated prima facie empirical evidence and 
referred to the results of existent studies that by and large find that file-sharing has 
harmed suppliers’ interests to some extent. Subject to the scale of the problem and the 
costs of private countermeasures, right holders can decide whether private 
enforcement measures make good business sense.  
However, concerning the justification of public investments into fighting unauthorised 
copying cannot be the end of the story. That is because consumers probably benefit 
from unauthorised copying in the short run. File-sharing facilitates access to a great 
number of recordings – perhaps many more than are available via conventional outlets 
– at low costs. These benefits to consumers have received little systematic attention. 
As a rare exception, Rob and Waldfogel (“Piracy on the High C’s”) estimate that 
consumers’ welfare gains from file-sharing are considerably higher than producers’ 
losses. This type of argument has not caught on among economists due to a crucial 
extension to the reasoning for copyright in a third step.  
3. If revenues to producers fall due to unauthorised copying, pecuniary incentives 
to produce and disseminate works will be diminished. Some of the producers 
that find it harder to recoup their costs will cease to operate. There will be fewer 
investments into creativity than would be ‘socially desirable’.16 The extent of 
this problem depends on how responsive producers are to pecuniary incentives. 
                                                 
16  What economists mean with this is that some resources, which would generate greater value for 
society if they were dedicated to the production of cultural works, are put to alternative uses. 
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Subject to the sensitivity of supply to falling pecuniary rewards, the 
underproduction of inexcludable cultural goods and services will be the 
outcome of unauthorised copying. Less new creations will be supplied. Landes 
(13) predicts with a view to file-sharing that “[…] given the speed and low cost 
of copying, as well as the difficulty of employing private measures to prevent 
copying, we would expect a decrease in the number of new works created […]” 
unless copyright protection is reinforced. 
This extension to the argument is crucial for determining the adequate level of public 
investments into copyright protection, because public policy does not aim to maximise 
revenues to private corporations but social welfare more generally – which includes 
consumers’ interests. In the short run, consumers might benefit from unauthorised 
copying. In the long run however, after suppliers have had the time to adapt their 
production decisions to changes in the market, this might not be the case. To the extent 
that the supply of new creative works does dry up in an environment of intensive 
unauthorised copying, unauthorised copying is not only a problem of suppliers but 
becomes a problem for consumers, i.e. society at large. That falling revenues to 
suppliers will translate into a diminished supply of creative works has largely been 
taken for granted in the debate on file-sharing. The extent to which this occurs in 
practice remains largely unspecified. That is one of the gaps in the research agenda on 
file-sharing, which the following section addresses. 
 
Gaps in the Research Agenda on File-Sharing and the Record Industry 
The economic literature on file-sharing and the record industry has focused on the 
harm of unauthorised copying for suppliers – the first two steps in the above account. 
Hardly any empirical work has been published on the obvious immediate benefits of 
file-sharing to consumers. It seems reasonable to expect that consumers’ interests will 
eventually be adversely affected if suppliers cease to make reproducible creative 
works available. The extent to which an adverse effect on suppliers comes to adversely 
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affect consumers’ interests has not been specified, however. Arguably, this is one of 
the most uncomfortable gaps in our knowledge concerning current copyright reforms. 
It harks back to the extensive and inconclusive literature on whether intellectual 
property such as patents or copyright does in practice foster innovation and creativity. 
Even if that were the case, public policy-making would benefit from specifying 
exactly how sensitive supply is to suppliers’ income and what role copyright 
protection plays in determining it.  
Nevertheless, this might appear to be an awkward question under the assumption that 
the record industry is competitive and production methods are stable as the impact of 
file-sharing is playing out. Under such circumstances, a displacement of demand due 
to increased unauthorised copying would certainly diminish supply. As seen in section 
two, however, these assumptions might not reflect the reality of the record industry to 
a satisfactory degree. Competition in the record industry is probably significantly less 
than perfect if recent objections to further mergers by competition authorities are 
anything to go by.17 At the same time, the industry seems to be caught up in a period 
of relatively swift technological change.  
Much of the literature on file-sharing does not address issues of competition and 
broader technological change (beyond the diffusion of copying technology). This is a 
second significant gap in the research agenda. It is worthwhile to go through a short 
reasoning why such an omission might matter. Innovation and technological change 
can imply that productivity increases – costs fall or the quality of products increases. 
Radical technological change further tends to subvert market power (e.g. Abernathy 
and Utterback; Freeman and Perez; Klepper). Many accounts of the history of the 
record industry find that to have been the case during past periods of swift 
technological change in the record industry. These saw the entry of a great number of 
small new firms that challenged and sometimes even did away with the predominant 
position of incumbents (see Gillet; Peterson and Berger; Chapple and Garofalo; Caves; 
Tschmuck). Both the erosion of market power and thus greater efficiency or 
                                                 
17  Strictly speaking, due to product differentiation the industry would be in state of monopolistic 
competition in the absence of barriers to entry. 
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technological change and greater productivity could mean that costs fall. If costs fall, 
suppliers’ profits need not be affected by falling revenues. Supply might remain stable 
or even grow in spite of falling revenues.  
This is a complex argument. Without empirical evidence supporting it, it holds little 
sway. The following section presents some exploratory empirical evidence regarding 
the record industry and the supply of sound recordings. It appears that supply has been 
surprisingly resilient in spite of falling revenues and high levels of unauthorised 
copying. The data suggests that the diffusion of copying technology is very likely to 
coincide with other significant changes in the record industry. 
 
Supply and Market Entry in the Presence of File-Sharing   
The following section of the paper addresses some quantitative data on the number of 
record companies in Germany and the supply of new publications in Germany and 
Britain. More than seven years after Napster established file-sharing as a mass 
phenomenon and after eight years of a severe recession in the market for recordings, to 
what extent has a problem on the supply side materialised? 
 
Market Entries (the Number of Record Companies) 
Record companies (i.e. organisations that acquire and commercialise rights to sound 
recordings) traditionally play a pivotal role in the record industry. They tend to 
coordinate the various specialised activities concerning the creation, reproduction and 
distribution of recordings. Figure 3 presents the number of paying members in two 
industry lead-bodies catering for record companies in Germany: the German division 
of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI Germany) and the 
German Association of Independent Labels, Publishers and Producers (VUT). A 
dotted grey line marks the beginning of the recession period. The IFPI Germany 
mainly attracts larger record companies. All major firms are members and so are their 
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subsidiaries as well as some of the larger, more commercially orientated indies. The 
VUT predominantly provides for smaller, independent record companies.  
FIGURE 3: Paying members in industry lead-
bodies catering for German record companies
Sources: Handke, "Plain Destruction" (BV Phono, various issues; 
VUT data-base)
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According to this data, the number of record companies in Germany has increased in 
spite of a severe recession and in the presence of high levels of unauthorised copying 
after 1997. Data on the number of record companies that are members with the 
collecting society Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten (GVL) 
confirms that there seems to have been alleviated numbers of market entries during the 
recession period. (For a more detailed discussion of the data, see Handke, “Plain 
Destruction”).  
An alleviated number of market entries is inconsistent with common-sensical 
expectations in the context of a severe recession and alleviated levels of unauthorised 
copying. What is more, apparently the population of larger record companies 
developed differently from that of smaller firms. The number of IFPI Germany 
members stagnated during the recession, while the number of VUT member firms that 
are mostly smaller record companies increased substantially. There seems to have been 
a greater number of market entries by smaller firms during the recession than in the 
preceding boom years in the German record industry. Handke (“Plain Destruction”) 
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suggests that this is more consistent with creative destruction in the context of 
technological change rather than with the demise of an industry due to unauthorised 
copying. 
 
The Number of New Publications in Both Britain and Germany 
Figure 4 exhibits a time-plot of the annual number of new albums released on the most 
widely used sound-carrier format of CDs in Britain (BPI, Statistical Handbook 2004 
and 2006) and Germany (BV Phono, Jahrbuch 2005 and 2004). To avoid double 
counting of the same content, singles and releases on other sound carrier formats than 
CDs (cassettes, vinyl records or minidisks) are excluded.18 So are any musical 
recordings that are published only as downloads. The data does not invite detailed 
cross-country comparisons because underlying methods differ and the data for 
Germany excludes imports whereas the data for Britain does not.19
                                                 
18  The BV Phono ceased to provide separate figures for CDs and cassettes after 2003. For 2004 and 
2005, the new category of album releases is presented. 
19  What is more, the BV Phono explicitly acknowledges important limitations to their measures of 
publications. They estimate that their figures capture only about half of the entire number of 
releases. Presumably, they capture the bulk of those releases that eventually become easily 
available to a wider public on tangible sound carriers, however. 
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FIGURE 4: Number of new albums released on CDs in 
Germany and Britain 








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Germany: number of new titles published on full-length CDs (excluding imports)
Britain: Number of new album releases on CDs
 
Neither of these two short time-series provides any evidence for any significant and 
permanent fall in the number of new releases in absolute terms with a surge in 
authorised copying after 1997. If anything in Britain, an expansion in the number of 
new publications might have slowed somewhat in the late 1990s but if that had 
something to do with unauthorised copying the effect was probably not permanent. 
After the year 2000, the average number of new publications per year in both Britain 
and Germany were very high in comparison to earlier years.  
Again, this conflicts with common-sensical predictions in the context of weak growth 
and a surge in unauthorised copying. Certainly, the descriptive analysis of the limited 
number of observations presented here does not support any firm conclusions. 
Nevertheless, this empirical evidence is clearly at odds with the view that falling 
revenues due to unauthorised copying would severely affect the supply of new sound 
recordings. This issue requires further attention.  
Investigating the number of publications helps to make this point. Quantitative 
methods of the type that is championed by economists will have its limits regarding 
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the resolution of this issue, however. Ultimately, the quality of the creative works 
supplied needs to be addressed. Other academic disciplines are better equipped to do 
so and the debate on unauthorised copying and changes in the record industry might 
benefit considerably from their contributions.  
 
Conclusions 
Changes to the copyright regime are among the most significant recent developments 
for the cultural industries. Today it is hardly possible to address those cultural 
industries that supply reproducible media content without acknowledging this issue.  
The predominant notion is that copyright is essential for commercially viable cultural 
production, because it defines property to cultural creations and allows suppliers to 
recoup investments into creativity. A recent surge in unauthorised copying – via CD-
burners and file-sharing networks – appears to require extensions of copyright law and 
more vigorous efforts to enforce these rights. Copyright matters even if one does not 
underwrite this view, simply because of the ongoing political and legal process that 
aims at nothing short of setting out the playing field for the way that reproducible 
aspects of cultural creations are handled in the future.  
Economic theory suggests that copyright relates to a trade-off of competing ends and 
that the right level of copyright protection depends on the specific conditions of the 
affected market. Empirical studies are crucial to guide copyright policy. There are at 
least two important gaps in the available literature: the first regards the extent to which 
unauthorised copying affects the supply of creative works and thus how consumers’ 
interests are affected; the second regards broader changes within the industry. 
Technological change and increasing competition might make it more difficult to 
isolate the effect of unauthorised copying. 
In fact, this paper presents some evidence that conflicts with the view that a recent 
period of falling sales and high levels of unauthorised copying would have had an 
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adverse impact on supply. There are three unexpected observations in the recession 
period: first, in Germany, the number of record companies has grown rapidly, and, 
second in particular many small firms have entered the market. Third, in both Britain 
and Germany, the number of new full-length releases on CDs has increased. 
In as far as these observations hold, the current recession in the record industry has 
neither been uniformly nor unambiguously harmful. Many smaller firms are entering 
the market and the number of new creative works supplied seems to have increased. 
Concerning the effects of the diffusion of powerful copying technology it seems that 
either this erosion of the copyright regime does not have the predicted adverse effects 
on the supply side, or other significant factors overlap with recession and diminished 
copyright protection. 
It remains to be seen whether the provisional empirical findings presented above can 
be confirmed in more comprehensive investigations. If the general drift of these 
observations is confirmed, the question is what explains the apparent resilience of 
supply. Regarding the basic economic characteristics of the record industry introduced 
in section 2.1, several hypothetical explanations come to mind. First, growth in 
alternative sources of revenue to suppliers might be an explanation. Yet for much of 
the time period under investigation, revenues generated via sales of downloads have 
been of minuscule size (and the German turnover figures include sales of downloads 
since 2004). There is also little evidence for additional earnings from the secondary 
market for copyrighted works (where performing or synchronisation rights are sold 
mainly to commercial users) that would have compensated for much of the losses in 
the primary market. Second, cost-reductions due to process innovation or lowered 
barriers to entry and increased competition in the context of technological change 
might be an explanation. Here, an important question is whether the Internet and 
perhaps even file-sharing actually foster competition because they diminish the 
reliance on the traditional promotion channels and retail outlets in which the products 
of smaller firms are rarely visible. Blackburn (A Study of Online Piracy) finds that 
sales of publications by previously well-known artists are diminished in the presence 
of file-sharing networks while file-sharing appears to boost record sales for previously 
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unknown artists. Third, the intrinsic motivation of many creators could provide an 
explanation for some of the resilience of supply. The costs of recording seem to have 
fallen with the diffusion of PCs and specialised software. Together with lower costs of 
promotion and distribution via the Internet, amateurs that do not rely on recovering all 
their costs when they supply recordings might become more important. Finally, 
copyright protection as it was before file-sharing might simply not have maximised 
incentives to produce. The costs of copyright protection might have been 
underestimated or its benefits overestimated.  
There is ample scope for further research on this and a multitude of other questions 
related to recent changes within the record industry. Specialised expertise on the 
idiosyncrasies of the cultural industries from a range of academic disciplines seems 
indispensable and could be fruitfully employed.  
Finally, the market value of music is probably not its most outstanding feature, as even 
economists readily admit (Liebowitz, “MP3 downloads”; Liebowitz and Watt). What 
is spent on music makes up a miniscule part of the economy. Nevertheless, as media 
content music is virtually omnipresent in daily live (Burnett 1; Vogel 192). Arguably, 
the most interesting questions relate to this wider meaning of music in society. 
Copyright reforms in the face of file-sharing are likely to exert an important influence 
on who consumes what, who contributes and who gains in the music industry and in 
other cultural industries. This field should not be left to the ploughs of economists or 
legal scholars alone. 
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